Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) & National Security
The New Border Control: How National Security Mandates Are Reshaping M&A and FDI
The right to buy an enterprise no longer guarantees the freedom to integrate it. Cross-border acquirers must assess which ownership, information and operating rights they can retain—and whether the transaction still creates value on those terms.
A transaction can satisfy the seller, secure financing and survive competition review while remaining unacceptable on national security grounds. The obstacle may be a technology portfolio, access to sensitive data, dependence on a critical supplier or the location of a facility.
For an acquirer, the consequences extend beyond the possibility of prohibition. An approval may preserve ownership while restricting the rights that made the acquisition attractive: integrating systems, directing sensitive operations, transferring technology or accessing detailed information.
The executive task is therefore to assess both whether a deal can close and what business the buyer will be permitted to operate afterwards. Clearance is valuable only if the resulting enterprise can deliver an acceptable commercial outcome.
Security follows the capability, not the sector label
Defence remains important, but a target need not manufacture weapons to raise security questions. Energy infrastructure, advanced technology, data services and critical mineral supply chains can all carry strategic significance, depending on the jurisdiction and the activities involved.
A small supplier may hold a difficult-to-replace capability. A software business may serve sensitive customers. A processing facility may occupy a critical position in a supply chain even when its products appear ordinary.
The UK government’s National Security and Investment Act guidance explains that qualifying acquisitions can involve entities or assets, including intellectual property. Certain entity acquisitions require approval before completion; completing a notifiable acquisition without approval makes it void and can expose the acquirer to penalties. The regime can also apply to UK buyers, so nationality alone does not resolve the question.
In the United States, CFIUS reviews certain foreign investment transactions and certain real estate transactions for national security effects. Its scope is not limited to conventional majority takeovers. The applicable rules and the rights acquired matter.
Screening analysis should begin with what the target does, what it holds and what the buyer could access or influence. A broad industry classification is only a starting point.
Ownership and usable control are different assets
Deal models often assume that ownership brings integration: shared technology, consolidated procurement, common systems and access to the target’s expertise. Security conditions can interrupt those assumptions.
A buyer may retain an economic interest while facing restrictions on particular information flows or management decisions. The resulting business might remain attractive as a more independent operation, but it may no longer justify the same acquisition premium.
Treasury’s 2024 CFIUS Annual Report describes mitigation measures including limits on information access, supply assurances, restrictions on certain communications and requirements concerning ownership or rights changes. These are examples of measures used in particular cases, not a standard package imposed on every investor.
The relevant acquisition price is the price of the business the buyer can lawfully operate after clearance.
This requires the buyer to separate essential rights from desirable efficiencies. Which decisions must remain under group control? Which data can be aggregated? Which technology transfers are indispensable? What value remains if the sensitive operation must function separately?
If the proposed remedy removes the transaction’s central economic purpose, the answer may be to change the perimeter, reduce the price or abandon the deal. No governance structure guarantees that every security concern can be reconciled with the buyer’s preferred control model.
Move security diligence ahead of the binding commitment
Early diligence should map the target’s activities, customers, technology, data, sites and supply dependencies. It should also establish the buyer’s ownership, ultimate control, financing arrangements and any relevant state connections.
The assessment must cover the transaction as a whole. Minority rights, board representation, contractual influence, intellectual property arrangements and asset purchases may be relevant even where the headline equity percentage appears modest.
Review obligations also need to be mapped across jurisdictions. A target headquartered in one country may have subsidiaries, assets or operations that engage screening rules elsewhere. Approval in one jurisdiction does not substitute for the decisions required in another.
The European Commission’s October 2026 update, for example, distinguishes the existing EU screening arrangements from the new Foreign Investment Screening Regulation, which will apply from 17 January 2028. Companies must identify the rules applicable to their transaction and timetable, rather than assume an announced framework is already fully operational.
Pre-signing information exchange needs its own safeguards. Security diligence should not itself give the prospective buyer unrestricted access to sensitive material. Controlled data rooms, appropriately constituted clean teams and staged disclosure can support assessment where legally permitted.
Allocate approval risk in the deal terms
A sale agreement should explain who is responsible for filings, how the parties will cooperate and what happens if authorities require conditions. A general promise to pursue approval leaves too much uncertainty when the proposed remedy becomes commercially significant.
The buyer should define the obligations it is prepared to accept. Possible limits may concern divestments, restrictions on essential intellectual property, separation of sensitive operations or conditions affecting businesses outside the target.
The seller needs corresponding certainty. If the buyer can reject almost any condition, the seller bears a substantial risk that the transaction fails after a prolonged process. The remedy standard, termination rights and any reverse break fee should reflect the allocation the parties actually intend.
The completion timetable should allow for filing preparation, acceptance, information requests and any extended assessment. Statutory review periods do not necessarily describe the full time from signing to an executable decision.
Interim operating covenants also require discipline. They can protect the business pending completion, but should not transfer control or enable integration before the necessary permissions and other applicable requirements have been satisfied.
Design governance around the specific security concern
A credible mitigation proposal begins with the identified risk. If the concern is access to a defined dataset, the response should explain who can access it, where access occurs, how it is authorised and how breaches will be detected.
If the concern is continuity of a critical service, the relevant controls may involve supply commitments, operational resilience or notification before specified changes. Governance must be supported by systems, staff and evidence.
The US Government Accountability Office’s review of CFIUS mitigation identifies information-system access controls as one example and describes monitoring through site visits, auditors and monitors. For a buyer, that reinforces the need to cost the operating arrangement after approval.
Management should establish how the parent will exercise legitimate commercial oversight without obtaining prohibited information or directing restricted activities. Reporting boundaries, delegated responsibilities and escalation procedures must work in practice.
A local holding company or a reduced shareholding does not, by itself, resolve security exposure. Authorities may examine ultimate ownership, substantive influence and information rights. A viable structure must address the underlying concern rather than obscure it.
Recalculate value after mitigation
Consider an illustrative acquisition of a data-intensive technology business. The buyer’s original case depends on combining customer analytics, integrating product development and consolidating infrastructure.
A proposed condition requires a sensitive operation and its data to remain separate. The acquisition may still be commercially attractive, but the original synergy estimate can no longer stand without revision.
The revised model should include permitted revenue opportunities, duplicated systems, security staffing, monitoring costs and delayed integration. It should also test how the restrictions affect future acquisitions, refinancing and eventual exit.
Where amendment or review procedures are available, their scope should be understood. A company should not build its valuation on an assumption that inconvenient conditions will later be relaxed.
Approval obligations need an owner after completion. Integration teams, directors and technology functions must understand the conditions before taking decisions. A requirement that is lost between the transaction team and the operating business can become an enforcement exposure.
The board must approve the permitted business
Before committing to a sensitive cross-border transaction, the board should require clear answers to five questions:
- What creates the security exposure? Identify the relevant capability, data, infrastructure, supply dependency or investor characteristic.
- Which rights create the acquisition’s value? Distinguish indispensable control and access from efficiencies that could be forgone.
- What remedies can the business absorb? Define operational and financial limits before they are tested in negotiations.
- Who carries failure and delay risk? Align filing responsibilities, remedy commitments, financing and termination provisions.
- Can the post-clearance model be operated? Confirm that governance, systems, reporting and ongoing compliance are practical and funded.
National security review can produce approval, conditions or prohibition; in some regimes it can also reach completed transactions. The powers and procedures differ, and political confidence cannot replace the required legal assessment.
For acquirers, the strongest position combines a credible investment case with a realistic operating model. Enterprise control is preserved most effectively when the buyer knows precisely which freedoms it needs and which restrictions it can accept.
The objective is to acquire a business whose permitted future still justifies the transaction.