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France’s Fragmented Parliament: Winning Elections Without Securing Governability

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Case Study 04 / Political Power & Institutional Governance

France / 2022–2024

France’s Fragmented Parliament: Winning Elections Without Securing Governability

Electoral victory can confer political legitimacy without providing the parliamentary authority required to govern. Between 2022 and 2024, France demonstrated how presidential power, constitutional institutions and legislative fragmentation can produce a government capable of remaining in office but increasingly constrained in its ability to implement policy. The crisis revealed the difference between winning an electoral mandate, commanding a parliamentary majority and maintaining the institutional capacity to govern.

The Strategic Context

The French Fifth Republic was established in 1958 to address the political instability associated with the Fourth Republic.

Its constitutional framework created a stronger executive authority while retaining parliamentary responsibility for the government.

The system was designed to prevent recurrent governmental instability from paralysing the state.

Yet the effectiveness of this arrangement has historically depended on the relationship between presidential authority and parliamentary support.

When the president enjoys a dependable majority in the National Assembly, the executive can usually pursue its legislative programme with considerable institutional support.

When the parliamentary majority belongs to the president’s opponents, the system can produce cohabitation, in which the president and prime minister represent different political forces.

A third possibility emerged with particular force after the legislative elections of 2022.

The president retained office, but his political coalition no longer controlled an absolute majority in the National Assembly.

The result did not eliminate executive authority.

It changed the conditions under which that authority could be exercised.

France entered a period in which the presidency remained constitutionally strong while the parliamentary foundations of government became increasingly uncertain.

The Strategic Problem

The central difficulty was the separation between electoral legitimacy and legislative control.

Emmanuel Macron won re-election as president in April 2022, defeating Marine Le Pen in the second round.

The presidential result granted him a renewed constitutional mandate.

However, the legislative elections held in June produced a substantially different political balance.

Macron’s Ensemble coalition secured the largest number of seats but failed to obtain an absolute majority in the 577-seat National Assembly.

A majority required 289 seats.

Under the Ministry of the Interior’s electoral classification, Ensemble candidates won 245 seats, leaving the presidential coalition dependent on support or abstention from other parliamentary forces.

The left-wing NUPES alliance emerged as a substantial opposition bloc, while the National Rally recorded a major parliamentary advance. The Republicans also retained a consequential group of deputies.

The result created a distinction between possessing the presidency and controlling the legislature.

The president remained constitutionally entitled to exercise his powers.

The government, however, could no longer assume that its proposed legislation would obtain parliamentary approval.

This was not simply a problem of political communication.

It was a structural limitation imposed by the composition of the National Assembly.

Presidential Legitimacy Does Not Produce Parliamentary Control

French presidential and legislative elections confer different forms of authority.

The presidential election determines the occupant of the presidency.

Legislative elections determine the composition of the National Assembly, which exercises important powers over legislation and the political responsibility of the government.

These mandates are constitutionally connected but not identical.

Winning the presidency does not guarantee that voters will elect a supporting parliamentary majority.

The 2022 elections demonstrated this distinction.

Macron’s victory established his continued authority as president.

The legislative result established that his political coalition could not independently command the votes required for ordinary majority-based legislative decisions.

This changed the strategic position of the government.

Legislation increasingly required negotiation, issue-specific agreements or reliance on constitutional procedures that could permit government action without a conventional majority vote.

The presidential mandate remained intact.

Its practical translation into legislative policy became more difficult.

The central lesson is that political authority cannot be assessed through a single electoral result.

It must be examined across the institutions whose cooperation is necessary to execute government decisions.

The Constitutional Architecture of the Fifth Republic

The French Constitution distinguishes the responsibilities of the president, the government and Parliament.

Under Article 5 of the Constitution, the president is responsible for ensuring respect for the Constitution and, through arbitration, the proper functioning of public authorities and continuity of the state.

Article 20 provides that the government determines and conducts the policy of the nation.

Article 21 assigns the prime minister responsibility for directing government action.

The government remains accountable to Parliament under the constitutional procedures established for that purpose.

This distribution of authority is essential.

France is frequently described as having a powerful presidency, particularly when the president’s supporters control the National Assembly.

But presidential authority does not eliminate the constitutional functions of Parliament.

Nor does it give the president unrestricted capacity to enact ordinary legislation independently of the legislature.

The effectiveness of the executive depends partly on the relationship between presidential leadership, government responsibility and parliamentary support.

When these elements operate in alignment, the system can provide considerable governing capacity.

When they diverge, the same constitutional framework can become a site of sustained political bargaining and institutional confrontation.

Minority Government and the Problem of Legislative Delivery

After the 2022 elections, Prime Minister Élisabeth Borne’s government confronted a National Assembly in which no dependable absolute majority supported the presidential coalition.

This required a different approach to governing.

Proposed legislation could no longer be treated as the predictable consequence of executive agreement.

The government needed to seek support from other parliamentary groups or rely on constitutional mechanisms available under specified conditions.

The difficulty was not necessarily that every opposition party rejected every government initiative.

Parliamentary cooperation remained possible on individual measures.

The problem was the absence of a durable majority capable of consistently supporting the government’s programme.

A government may secure enough parliamentary support to pass one measure while lacking the votes required for the next.

This produces uncertainty over legislative sequencing, reform timetables and the durability of political commitments.

The consequences extend beyond parliamentary debate.

Businesses, public authorities and investors may rely on anticipated legislation when making long-term decisions.

When parliamentary support is uncertain, the timing and content of reform become less predictable.

The distinction is therefore between political survival and legislative capacity.

A government can remain in office without possessing reliable control over its legislative agenda.

Article 49.3: Constitutional Authority Without an Ordinary Majority Vote

One of the most consequential features of France’s institutional response was the use of Article 49, paragraph 3, commonly known as Article 49.3.

This constitutional mechanism allows the government, under specified conditions, to make the passage of a bill dependent on the confidence of the National Assembly.

The bill is considered adopted unless a motion of no confidence is submitted and approved under the applicable constitutional rules.

The procedure is subject to limitations.

It may be used for finance bills and social-security financing bills, while its use for other legislation is restricted to one additional bill per parliamentary session.

Article 49.3 does not mean that Parliament ceases to possess constitutional authority.

Rather, it changes the decision confronting deputies.

Instead of voting directly on the proposed legislation, the Assembly may be required to determine whether it is prepared to bring down the government.

This creates a significant distinction.

A parliamentary group may oppose a measure without being willing to support the government’s removal.

The government can consequently secure enactment of legislation despite lacking an affirmative majority for the measure itself, provided a motion of no confidence does not succeed.

The procedure is constitutionally established.

Its political consequences, however, can be substantial.

Repeated reliance on Article 49.3 may demonstrate that the government retains the institutional means to legislate while exposing the weakness of its parliamentary support.

A government may possess the constitutional means to enact legislation without possessing a parliamentary majority that positively endorses the legislation.

This distinction became particularly significant during the pension reform controversy of 2023.

Pension Reform and the Limits of Political Consent

The French government’s pension reform became one of the defining political confrontations of the 2022–2024 period.

The reform included increasing the statutory retirement age from 62 to 64, subject to the applicable transition arrangements and exceptions.

The government presented the changes as necessary to address the financial sustainability of the pension system.

Opponents disputed the necessity, design and distributional consequences of the reform.

The proposals generated extensive demonstrations and industrial action.

In March 2023, the government used Article 49.3 in connection with the pension reform legislation rather than proceeding to an ordinary final vote in the National Assembly.

Opposition groups submitted motions of no confidence.

The principal cross-party motion failed by nine votes, receiving 278 votes when 287 were required under the applicable parliamentary circumstances.

The government survived.

The legislation proceeded through the constitutional process and was subsequently promulgated after Constitutional Council review, which struck down certain provisions but allowed the core increase in retirement age.

The episode illustrated the distinction between lawful enactment and broad political consent.

The government possessed a constitutional mechanism capable of enabling passage.

It did not thereby eliminate the political opposition to the measure.

Nor did the failure of the no-confidence motion establish that the legislation enjoyed a stable affirmative parliamentary majority.

The strategic problem was therefore not whether the government had acted through a constitutionally recognised procedure.

It was whether the continued use of such procedures could sustain the political authority required for effective government over time.

Governing Capacity and Public Legitimacy

Governing capacity is not determined solely by the number of laws a government can enact.

It also depends on the ability to maintain institutional cooperation, administrative continuity and sufficient political support to implement decisions.

A government may pass legislation while encountering sustained opposition from social organisations, professional groups, parliamentary parties or regional interests.

These forms of opposition are part of democratic political competition.

They do not automatically invalidate legislation.

Nevertheless, they can affect implementation costs, administrative coordination and the political durability of reform.

France’s experience demonstrated how constitutional mechanisms can preserve formal government action while wider political conditions remain unsettled.

The distinction is important.

Legal validity establishes whether a decision has been adopted according to the applicable constitutional and statutory requirements.

Political legitimacy concerns broader questions of democratic representation, public acceptance and institutional confidence.

The two are related, but they are not identical.

A government can act lawfully while confronting substantial political disagreement.

Conversely, strong public support for a proposal does not itself confer the legal authority required to implement it.

Effective governance requires navigating both conditions.

The 2024 Dissolution: An Attempt to Restore Political Clarity

In June 2024, following the European Parliament elections in which the National Rally list substantially outperformed the presidential camp in France, President Macron announced the dissolution of the National Assembly.

Under Article 12 of the Constitution, the president possesses the authority to dissolve the Assembly, subject to the applicable procedural requirements.

The dissolution produced new legislative elections on 30 June and 7 July 2024.

The decision was constitutionally lawful but politically consequential.

Dissolution offered the possibility of obtaining a new parliamentary configuration.

It also exposed the presidency to the risk that voters would return an Assembly no more supportive—and potentially more fragmented— than the previous one.

The strategic issue was whether an electoral contest could resolve a problem created by the distribution of parliamentary power.

Elections can change that distribution.

They cannot guarantee that the resulting balance will provide a dependable governing majority.

The 2024 outcome demonstrated precisely this limitation.

The 2024 Election: Three Blocs Without an Absolute Majority

The second-round results of the July 2024 legislative election produced a fragmented National Assembly.

The New Popular Front, formed by left-wing parties, emerged as the largest broad electoral alliance in seat terms.

The presidential camp retained a substantial parliamentary presence, while the National Rally and its allies also secured a large number of seats.

However, no single bloc obtained the 289 seats required for an absolute majority.

The exact totals attributed to each alliance vary according to whether analysts use electoral alliances, interior-ministry classifications or parliamentary groups formed after the election.

The institutional outcome is clearer than the classification differences.

France emerged from the election without a single political bloc capable of independently commanding an absolute majority in the National Assembly.

The dissolution had not restored the parliamentary dominance associated with the early years of Macron’s presidency.

Instead, it produced a more complex balance among competing political forces.

This created several possible routes to governing, each carrying constraints.

A government might seek a formal coalition, attempt issue-by-issue negotiation, rely on opposition abstention or operate as a minority administration exposed to motions of no confidence.

None of these arrangements was equivalent to a dependable parliamentary majority.

The result was a political system in which the presidency remained constitutionally established while the formation and survival of government became increasingly dependent on parliamentary bargaining.

The Difference Between Winning Seats and Acquiring Power

The 2024 election demonstrated that electoral success does not necessarily produce control of government.

A party or alliance may emerge with the largest number of seats without obtaining an absolute majority.

In a fragmented legislature, other political forces may prevent that alliance from securing support for its preferred government.

The ability to govern depends on constitutional procedures, coalition negotiations and the willingness of parliamentary actors to support or tolerate a ministry.

This differs from the logic of a presidential election.

The winner of a presidential contest acquires the office according to the applicable electoral rules.

The largest political group in a fragmented parliamentary election does not automatically obtain unrestricted control of the executive.

In France, the president appoints the prime minister, but the government’s survival depends on its relationship with the National Assembly.

The constitutional framework therefore requires political arrangements capable of operating across institutions whose mandates may diverge.

This is why the number of seats won is only one component of the governing calculation.

The more consequential question is whether those seats can be converted into an arrangement capable of sustaining government action.

From Parliamentary Fragmentation to Government Vulnerability

The post-election situation in 2024 demonstrated the practical difficulty of translating the electoral balance into a stable government.

Gabriel Attal, who had become prime minister in January 2024, submitted his resignation following the legislative election.

After a prolonged period of consultations, Macron appointed Michel Barnier as prime minister in September 2024.

Barnier’s government did not command an absolute majority in the National Assembly.

Its survival therefore depended on the parliamentary positions of forces outside the governing coalition.

This arrangement could sustain government activity only while sufficient opposition deputies declined to support a motion of no confidence.

The consequence was a form of conditional political authority.

The prime minister and government possessed constitutional responsibilities.

Their continued exercise of those responsibilities depended on a fragmented Assembly in which support could not be assumed.

This condition became especially consequential when the government confronted budgetary decisions requiring parliamentary action.

Although Barnier’s removal by a no-confidence vote occurred in December 2024, beyond the main July election sequence, it provides a direct demonstration of the vulnerability created by the fragmented parliamentary balance.

The government’s fall should not be treated as an inevitable consequence of the July result.

It illustrates, however, how a government without a dependable parliamentary majority can face severe difficulties when attempting to secure support for contested fiscal measures.

The Role of the President Under Fragmentation

The Fifth Republic gives the French presidency substantial constitutional responsibilities.

Yet the exercise of presidential authority depends on the institutional context.

When a supportive parliamentary majority exists, the president’s political programme can often be implemented through a government aligned with that majority.

When the Assembly is fragmented, the president must operate within a more complex environment.

The appointment of a prime minister does not by itself create parliamentary support.

Presidential direction does not eliminate the government’s accountability to the Assembly.

Nor can dissolution guarantee the emergence of a more favourable legislative balance.

The president retains significant constitutional powers, including responsibilities in foreign affairs and defence within the relevant constitutional framework.

But the capacity to implement domestic legislative priorities remains conditioned by the parliamentary relationship.

The 2022–2024 period therefore illustrates an important feature of semi-presidential governance.

A strong presidency can coexist with a politically vulnerable government.

Formal presidential authority and effective legislative control are not interchangeable.

Why the Electoral System Matters

France’s legislative elections use a two-round constituency-based system.

The system creates incentives for political alliances, candidate withdrawals and strategic coordination between rounds.

It does not operate as a straightforward proportional allocation of parliamentary seats according to national vote share.

Local electoral conditions and second-round arrangements can substantially influence the final distribution.

In 2024, agreements and withdrawals among candidates opposed to the National Rally in many constituencies affected the structure of second-round contests.

These decisions reflected the electoral calculations of the participating parties and candidates.

The resulting Assembly contained several substantial blocs without a single dominant parliamentary force.

This demonstrates the importance of distinguishing national political support from institutional representation.

A party may attract substantial votes without obtaining enough parliamentary seats to govern.

An alliance may win the largest number of seats while remaining unable to establish a majority.

The outcome of an election is therefore not fully understood until its results are translated into the decision-making structure of the legislature.

The Consequences for Economic Policy and Investment

Parliamentary fragmentation has implications beyond political competition.

Governments make commitments concerning taxation, public expenditure, infrastructure, industrial policy and regulation.

Businesses evaluate these commitments when allocating capital, planning operations and assessing long-term exposure.

Yet proposed legislation may be delayed, amended or rejected when no stable parliamentary majority exists.

Budgetary uncertainty can become especially consequential.

A government may announce a fiscal programme without possessing dependable support for its adoption.

Even when constitutional procedures provide alternative mechanisms, their use can create political confrontation and expose the government to confidence votes.

For investors, the distinction is not simply between stable and unstable government.

It is between political survival and legislative delivery.

A minority government may remain in office and continue executing existing law while lacking the parliamentary capacity to adopt significant new measures.

A government may secure one policy through negotiation while being unable to obtain agreement on another.

Political risk therefore becomes specific to the decision being considered.

An investment dependent on existing enforceable law faces a different exposure from a project requiring future subsidies, regulatory amendments or parliamentary budget authorisation.

The appropriate analysis should identify which commitments are institutionally secure and which remain contingent on parliamentary bargaining.

The Limits of Constitutional Mechanisms

The French Constitution contains mechanisms designed to preserve institutional continuity and enable government action.

Article 49.3 can facilitate the adoption of specified legislation without an ordinary affirmative vote.

Article 12 permits dissolution of the National Assembly under constitutional conditions.

The president appoints the prime minister, while the government exercises responsibilities defined by the Constitution.

These powers can help institutions operate during political fragmentation.

They do not remove the underlying requirement for political support.

The use of a constitutional mechanism may resolve an immediate legislative obstacle while generating further political confrontation.

Dissolution may create a new electoral opportunity while producing an equally difficult parliamentary configuration.

Appointment powers may establish a government without providing that government with a durable majority.

This is the distinction between institutional continuity and governing effectiveness.

Constitutional procedures can preserve the functioning of the state.

They cannot guarantee agreement among political forces whose priorities remain fundamentally different.

Strategic Findings

01 / Presidential victory does not guarantee legislative authority.

The 2022 elections demonstrated that the presidency and National Assembly can reflect different political balances, even when elections occur within the same general electoral cycle.

02 / A minority government can survive without controlling its legislative programme.

The ability to remain in office depends on different parliamentary conditions from those required to obtain affirmative support for ordinary legislation.

03 / Constitutional mechanisms can preserve action without resolving political fragmentation.

Procedures such as Article 49.3 provide lawful means of governing, but they do not automatically produce durable political agreement.

04 / Electoral competition can deepen fragmentation rather than restore governability.

The dissolution of 2024 produced a new Assembly without an absolute majority for any single bloc, demonstrating the uncertainty of using elections to resolve parliamentary deadlock.

05 / Governing capacity depends on the conversion of representation into executable authority.

The relevant measure is not simply the number of seats a political force wins, but whether those seats can sustain legislation, budgets and the institutional decisions required for government action.

The Strategic Conclusion

France’s experience between 2022 and 2024 demonstrates that electoral legitimacy and governing capacity are distinct political conditions.

Emmanuel Macron secured re-election as president in 2022.

His political coalition subsequently failed to obtain an absolute majority in the National Assembly.

The government continued to exercise authority but encountered increasing difficulties in securing ordinary legislative support.

Constitutional procedures enabled important measures to proceed, while political disagreement remained substantial.

The dissolution of 2024 produced another electoral mandate for a newly constituted Assembly.

It did not generate a dependable governing majority.

Instead, France confronted a parliamentary balance in which several competing political forces possessed significant representation, but none could independently determine the direction of government.

The crisis did not demonstrate the disappearance of constitutional authority.

French institutions continued to operate within the framework of the Fifth Republic.

It demonstrated the limits of what those institutions could accomplish without a stable political agreement among parliamentary forces.

For political leadership, the lesson concerns the difference between obtaining office and establishing the conditions necessary to govern.

For public institutions, it concerns the preservation of administrative continuity under fragmented political authority.

For corporations and investors, it concerns the reliability of policy commitments that depend on parliamentary approval and the continued survival of minority governments.

The French case illustrates a broader principle of political strategy.

An election determines the distribution of political authority. It does not guarantee that the resulting distribution will permit coherent government. Winning office is one decision; securing the institutional capacity to govern is another.

Institutional sources and further reading

Methodological note: This independent retrospective case study examines France’s presidential and parliamentary political developments between 2022 and 2024. It distinguishes constitutional authority, electoral results and the practical conditions of governing capacity. It does not represent an Eustochos client engagement or confidential political advisory mandate. The discussion of December 2024 is included as a subsequent institutional consequence of the parliamentary configuration established earlier that year.

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